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Abstract 
We reconsider the effects of an artificially low interest rate policy, 
which was typically implemented in Japan until the early 1970s. This 
policy is defined as a combination of the interest rate ceiling and ra-
tioning rules that assign a priority-lending status to export sectors; it 
should be distinguished from the simple interest rate ceiling. We re-
veal that the simple interest rate ceiling leads to credit rationing and 
does not increase national income, while the artificially low interest 
rate works as an export-promotion policy; that is, it increases exports, 
national income, and welfare. 
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1 Introduction 
The policy of Interest rate ceilings was widely observed in many developing 
and middle-developed countries, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Under this policy, governments enforced low interest rates by establishing 
a ceiling for deposit and/or lending interest rates through legislation and 
intervention. The purpose of an interest rate ceiling was to create an envi-
ronment in which private banks can finance domestic firms at low interest 
'We would like to thank Kenzo Abe, Colin Davis, Jun-ichi Itaya, Masayuki Okawa, 
Hiroshi Ono, Yoshiro Tsutsui, Makoto Yano, and Laixun Zhao for their valuable comments 
and suggestions. All remaining errors are, of course, our responsibilities. 
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rates. It was believed that these firms promote capital accumulation, leading 
to economic development of the country. 
However, interest rate ceilings give rise to excess demand in financial 
markets - a phenomenon credit rationing. This creates a distortion in the 
financial markets and a decrease in the funds available for capital accumu-
lation. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) assert that interest rate ceilings 
are unfavorable because they create financial repression, l and conclude that 
the distortion in financial prices reduces the real growth rate and inhibits 
financial deepening. Therefore, they suggest that governments should lib-
eralize their financial markets. Their criticisms are persuasive, and many 
economists agree with their arguments. 
Although a trend in financial liberalization was observed, interest rate 
ceilings were implemented in several countries. In particlllar, from the 1950s 
to the early 1970s, the Japanese government created a financial system based 
on interest rate ceilings. During this period, financial transactions with 
foreign countries were strictly regulated under the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law and the Foreign Capital Law. The Japanese 
government also controlled most interest rates, instituted various regulations 
on domestic financial transactions, and intervened to concentrate the lending 
of funds to particular manufacturing sectors. Figure 1 illustrates the share of 
loans provided by the Development Bank of Japan, which is a special bank 
for supplying long-term funds, from 1956 to 1971. The shares are classified 
by some policy aims of the Development Bank of Japan. The share of 
"Improvement of industrial infrastructure," whose main items were maritime 
industry, electricity, coal, oil, and wharf, occupied most of the lending in 
the 1950s, while it decreased during the 1960s. On the other hand, the 
share of "Improvement of international competitiveness and technological 
development," whose main items were textile, iron and steel, automobile, 
and chemicals, had increased in the 1960s. According to Hidaka (2009a), 
the Development Bank of Japan set a special lending rate, which is the 
lower than its basic lending interest rate. The implementation of the special 
lending rate increased in industries in the "Improvement of International 
Competitiveness ·and Technological Development" toward the end of the 
1960s. 
Figure 2 illustrates the amount of exports in these industries from 1956 
to 1972. It shows that the exports of all these industries sharply increased 
since the end of 1960s. This period is coincident with that when the amount 
1 Giovannini and de Melo (1993) define financial repression as a combination of controls 
on international capital flows with restrictions on domestic interest rates. 
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of loans and appliance of the special interest rate had increased in these 
industries in order to promote their competitiveness. Although the share 
in policy-based finance was not large, we can deduce that loans successfully 
lead to increased productivity and high growth in these industries. 
On the basis of the criticism by McKinnon and Shaw, we may infer that 
the interest rate ceiling is harmful. However, the period from the 1960s to 
the early 1970s is often referred to as "the era of rapid economic growth." 
The Japanese economy achieved a real economic growth rate of more than 
10 percent per year. In particular, exports of manufactured products grew 
rapidly. This might imply that the international competitiveness of Japanese 
manufacturing industries improved in this period. 
Demetriades and Luintel (2001) suggest that the government of South 
Korea had adopted this policy from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. Priority 
sectors, which were mainly export-oriented industries, received inexpensive 
bank credit. They conclude that this financial restraint has a positive and 
significant effect on financial development in South Korea. 
Then, is the interest rate ceiling absolutely harmful? We consider the 
possibility that it is effective as an export-promoting policy. To prove this, 
we set up a small country model in an overlapping-generations setting and 
investigate the effects of the interest rate ceiling on exports, national income, 
and welfare. The interest rate ceiling is a regulation that keeps the interest 
rate of lending funds less or equal to the ceiling level. Decreasing the lending 
interest rate by setting a ceiling leads to an increase in fund demand from the 
exportable manufacturing sector. However, since the savings of households 
do not increase, this sector faces credit rationing. Credit rationing is a new 
resource constraint, which cannot expand its production. As a result, the 
simple interest rate ceiling does not work as an export-promoting policy. 
Credit rationing is a crucial reason that the interest rate ceiling does not 
work. Thus, we provide an alternative option for the interest rate ceiling to 
prevent the rise of credit rationing. We define an artificially low interest rate 
as a policy package2 comprising the interest rate ceiling and a rationing rule 
that assigns a priority-lending status to a particular sector. The rationing 
rule provides sufficient funds to the export sector at a low interest rate, and 
the sector increases its exports. At the same time, other sectors in this 
country struggle owing to a dearth of funds. We show, however, that if the 
former effect sufficiently raises national income, national welfare is improved 
2Teranishi (1982) and Horiuchi (1984) point out that the artificially low interest rate in 
Japan refers not only to a policy of keeping the interest rate low, i.e., interest rate ceiling, 
but also to other systematic financial policies such as interventions to the financial flow. 
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by the artificially low interest rate. In sum, we conclude that the simple 
interest rate ceiling is not effective, while the artificially low interest rate is 
effective as an export-promoting policy and it increases national income and 
welfare. 
Several studies ha,v~ positively evaluated interest rate ceiling and criti-
cized the literature on financial repression.3 Considerable empirical evidence 
shows that financial restraints, including interest. rate restrictions, have a 
positive effect on financial development (e.g., Demetriades and Luintel2001; 
Arestis et al. 2002; Arestis et al. 2003). Moreover, Hellmann et al. (1996, 
1997) discuss the possibility that interest rate ceilings reduce the problem 
of asymmetric information in financial transactions and promote economic 
development. Demetriades and Devereux (2000) study a case wherein the 
restriction of lending rate increases the long-run equilibrium aggregate cap-
ital stock. Daitoh (2003) explores the relationship between interest rate 
ceilings and unemployment in developing countries. While our paper also 
evaluates interest rate ceiling positively, its approach is quite different. The 
above studies are based on traditional economic and financial development. 
In contrast, this paper focuses on another aspect of the interest rate ceiling; 
. that is, it sheds light on the effects of interest rate ceiling on exports. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic 
model and investigates the effect of the simple interest rate ceiling. Section 
3 ·extends the model and analyzes the effect of the artificially low interest 
rate. Section 4 considers the reasonability of our assumptions and discusses 
the robustness of our results. Finally, section 5 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
2 Interest rate ceiling 
2.1 The model 
There are two economic regions: a middle-developed small country (home) 
and the rest of the world (foreign). The exchange rate is fixed at unity. The 
home country has a household sector and a financial interm~diate sector, 
and two production sectors: primary and manufacturing. We assume that 
there are two factors of production: labor and capital. The rate of capital 
depreciation is 100%. Capital is supplied through the investment of house-
hold savings in the financial intermediate sector. While the manufacturing 
3Fry (1995) indicates the relationship between financial liberalization and financial 
. regulation. Arestis and Demetriades (1997) provide an overview on empirical literature in 
the field. 
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sectors use both labor and capital in production, the primary sector only 
uses labor. The primary good is sold in a perfectly competitive world mar-
ket with no trade costs. We assume that one unit of the primary good is 
produced from one unit of labor by a constant return to scale technology, 
and we regard the primary good as numeraire. Then, wage rate equals one 
in equilibrium.4 
In the economy, there are N types of manufacturing goods indexed by n 
(n = 1" .. ,N) that are sold in integrated world markets. We assume that 
the home small country has only one manufacturing firm in the first type of 
manufacturing sector (n = 1), and call it fum h. This firm sells its products 
to an integrated world market that is characterized by a Cournot duopoly. 
The rival firm in the rest of the world is called firm f. 
The interest rate ceiling policy is a regulation on the financial interme-
diate sector. By setting an upper-limit on the lending interest rate, the 
government in the home country keeps the lending interest rate down for 
firm h. In the following subsections, we provide further details of our model. 
2.1.1 Households 
We consider a household sector with overlapping generations. The popu-
lation of each generation is constant and normalized to one; there is no 
population growth. We assume that households are internationally immo-
bile, and live for two periods: young and old. Time is denoted by superscript 
t = 0, 1, . ". Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor in their 
young period only. For simplicity, we assume that the household does not 
consume in the young period and deposits all wage income in the financial 
intermediate sector for consumption in the old period. Since the wage is 
kept at one from the assumptions of the primary sector, the value of total 
deposits in the home country is one. In period t + 1, the old household 
receives the principal and interest it, which is the gross interest rate on 
deposits. Moreover, the household inherits shares in firm h in the manufac-
turing sector from parents at the end of the young period. The dividends 
from shares equal firm h's profit 'Trh. Therefore, an old household's income 
in period t + 1, ]t+l, is 
]t+l = it + 'Tr~+l. 
The preferences of a household in generation t are given by 
U t = 1Jx log Xt+l + 1Jy log yt+l, 
(1) 
(2) 
4 The main purpose for considering a primary sector is to set the wage to one and to 
simplify the labor market. See Dixit and Grossman (1986). 
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where each 'r/j (j = X, y) is a positive constant and TJx + TJy = 1, y is 
the consumption of primary goods, and X = X (Xl, ... ,X N) represents the 
consumption of each manufacturing good xn(n = 1"" ,N). Since we only 
focus on the stationary equilibrium, we omit the superscript t in the following 
analysis. 
2.1.2 The manufacturing sector 
There are only two firms, firm h in the home country and firm f in the rest of 
the world, capable of producing the manufacturing good with index n = l. 
These firms engage in Cournot competition in the integrated world market. 
We omit the subscript of Xl when considering only the n = 1 manufacturing 
sector in the following. Each firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
X = aka z1- a , (3) 
where k and Z are the capital and labor inputs respectively, a is a positive 
constant, and a E (0,1). From (3), we obtain the capital demand function 
kh: . 
k -1 1-0.(1 )-(l-a) -(I-a) h = a a - a T Xh, (4) 
where T is the lending interest rate for the manufacturing sector in the hOII).e 
country. Note that the wage rate is one. The inverse demand for products 
in the world market is given by 
(5) 
Evidently, the demand depends on the total world income. However, from 
the small country assumption, the policy of the home country does not affect 
world income. Thus, we consider world income as a constant. 
2.1.3 The financial intermediate sector 
The financial intermediate sector comprises several identical banks that en-
gage in Bertrand competition. Here, we do not explicitly consider the cost 
function of banks. Regardless of the cost function considered, each bank re-
ceives zero profit because of Bertrand competition among identical banks.5 
5Por analytical simplicity, we consider Bertrand competition among identical banks 
without explicit cost function. Section 4 discusses the cases where we explicitly consider 
the cost function of banks and where banks have positive profit margins. However, in 
both the cases, our upcoming results qualitatively hold. 
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Note that since the government controls the lending interest rate, firm h 
does not hold monopolistic power in the lending market. 
The interest rate in the rest of the world, R, is constant because the 
home country is small. If the home country can trade funds with the rest 
of the world with negligible transaction costs, the deposit and lending rates 
must equal the world interest rate, i.e., i = r = R, because of the small 
country assumption. Here, we assume that the government enforces a re-
striction on foreign exchange. Suppose that a transaction cost per unit of 
funds, T, is incurred by agents who transact funds overseas. This transac-
tion cost T includes costs of administration procedures for the transaction 
of foreign exchange and foreign investment as well as communication and 
agency costs. The government can increase this transaction cost by setting 
various regulations on foreign exchange.6 Therefore, we have the interval of 
these interest rates in equilibrium: 
i,rE [max{R-T,l},R+T]' (6) 
where the lower limit is at least one because we consider a gross interest 
rate. This interval contracts with a decrease in T. Note that this restriction 
not only prevents capital flight associated with a low interest rate but also 
prevents the inflow of foreign funds. 
Next, we consider the level of the interest rate ceiling in the lending 
market for the manufacturing sector, if. The interest rate ceiling prevents 
banks from lending funds to the manufacturing sector at an interest rate 
higher than if. If if> r*, where the asterisk is used to represent the laissez-
faire economy, this regulation is not effective. If 1 S; if < R - T, this policy 
may lead to capital flight. Thus, we find the range of if for which the interest 
rate ceiling binds: 
r E [max{R-T,l},r*). (7) 
International capital flows are blocked by the restriction on foreign ex-
change. Because the savings of households equals to one and the capital 
demand function is downward sloping from (4), this policy leads to excess 
demand in the lending market. Thus, the available capital for firm h is fixed 
as one, i.e., 
(8) 
where the upper-bar is used to denote that an interest rate ceiling has been 
implemented. In this section, the deposit interest rate equals the lending 
6In Japan between the 1950s and the early 1980s, financial transactions with foreign 
countries were strictly regulated under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law and the Foreign Capital Law. 
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interest rate by the zero-profit condition for banks: 
i = f. (9) 
Since we consider the case where domestic gross interest rates are in the 
range of (6), there is no flow of international funds in equilibrium. More-
over, the exchange rate is fixed, and the volumes of exports and imports for 
primary goods are determined by the balance of payments. 
2.2 Effects of interest rate ceiling 
In this subsection, we analyze the effects of interest rate ceiling. First, we 
derive the cost functions of manufacturing firms hand j. With respect to 
firm j, it minimizes its total cost Gf = l + Rk subject to the production 
function in (3). The cost function of firm j is 
G -1 -a(1 )-(l-a)Ra j=a c:t -c:t Xj, (10) 
On the other hand, with respect to firm h, it minimizes its total cost Gh = 
l + fk subject to two constraints: the production function, (3), and the 
resource constraint from credit rationing, (8). Thus, we obtain the cost 
function of firm h as follows: 
(11) 
Since the capital input is fixed by credit rationing, (11) has the same form 
as the short-run Cobb-Douglas cost function. From (11), since ~ = 1, the 
decrease in the interest rate ceiling reduces the total cost of firm h. However, 
since aa
2
Cah_ = 0, we find that the interest rate ceiling does not change the 
Xh r 
marginal cost of firm h. 
The profits of firms hand j are 7fh = PxXh - Gh and 7fj = Pxxf - Gf, 
respectively. The first-order conditions for profit maximization are 
-1 ~ P~Xh + Px - a1-a (1 - c:t)-lx~-a = 0, 
P~Xj + Px - a-1c:t-a(l- c:t)-(l-a)Ra =.0, 
(12) 
(13) 
Solving (12) and (13) yields the outputs and profits. By total differentiation 
of (12) and (13) with respect to f, we have 
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We assume that Dij = P:; Xi + P~ < 0 and Dii = P:; Xi + 2P~ < 0 for the 
stability conditions of Cournot competition (i,j = h,j). In this case, we 
find that ~ = 0 and ~ = O. That is, the interest rate ceiling has no 
effect on the market share in Cournot duopoly because the policy does not 
change the marginal cost. Thus, the interest rate ceiling does not change 
exports. 
Next, we consider the effect of the interest rate ceiling on national in-
come. In this model, the wage income earned by young households is one. 
Old households accrue the dividend from firm h, Wh, and income from de-
posit interest 1, - 1 because 1, is the gross interest rate. Therefore, national 
income in period t is 1, + Wh, which equals expenditure in the old period 
as (1). Since o/!t = -1, this policy increases the profit of firm h and the 
household income derived from dividends because it reduces the fixed cap-
ital cost. On the other hand, from (9) we have ~! = 1. This implies that 
the interest rate ceiling on the lending market reduces the deposit interest 
rate. From (1), national income remains unchanged when the interest rate 
ceiling policy is implemented. Furthermore, since the policy does not change 
the price of the manufacturing good, welfare remains unaltered. The above 
results are summarized as the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 The simple interest rate ceiling does not change exports, 
and thus, does not change national income and welfare. 
Proposition 1 illustrates a consequence induced by credit rationing. From 
(4), a reduction in the lending interest rate leads to an increase in capital 
demand from firm h. However, because the decrease of the lending interest 
rate reduces the deposit interest rate through the zero-profit condition of 
banks, households' savings (i.e., capital supply) is constant. Credit rationing 
leads to a new resource constraint for firm h as (8). Therefore, the simple 
interest rate ceiling does not change the marginal cost for firm h owing to 
the shortage of available capital. 
3 Artificially low interest rate 
In this section, we examine whether the artificially low interest rate, which 
is the combination of interest rate ceiling and a rationing rule, can improve 
national income and welfare. We extend the model for this purpose. 
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3.1 The extended model 
We introduce an extra production sector, called the service sector, into our 
model. Firms in the service sector only supply their services to a perfectly 
competitive domestic market. The preferences of households are rewritten 
as 
ut = 'TJx log XHI + 'TJy log yHl + 'TJz log zHl, (14) 
where z is the consumption of services, 'TJz is a positive constant, and 'TJx + 
'TJy + 'TJz = 1. From (1) and (14), the demand for services is 
(15) 
where Pz is the price of services. 
Next, we reconsider the financial sector and the relevant regulations. As 
in the previous section, the interest rate ceiling leads to excess demand in 
the lending market. Suppose the government establishes a rationing rule 
that orders all banks to lend funds advantageously to the manufacturing 
sector. That is, all banks must lend a certain fraction of their funds to firm 
h in order to satisfy the capital demand of firm h ,(4), at r = r. Once 
the manufacturing sector has obtained sufficient fund:;;, banks can lend the 
remaining funds to the service sector at another interest rate rz . We assume 
r z E [max{R-r,I},R+rj. Therefore, the amount of capital available 
(capital supply) in the service sector, SAr), is determined as a residual of 
the savings from the capital demand of the manufacturing sector in (4). 
Therefore, the capital supply for the service sector is 
(16) 
Under these regulations, the lending market will be segmented: for firm h 
and for the service sector. Hence the lending rates may differ between the 
two sectors. 
The production function of the service sector is also a Cobb-Douglas 
form: z = bk{3Z1-{3, where j3 E (0,1) and b is a positive constant. From the 
cost minimization problem, we have the cost function Cz and the capital 
demand function kz: 
Cz = b-1j3-{3(1 - j3)-(l-{3)r~z, 
kz = b-1j31-{3(1 - j3)-(l-{3)r;(1-!3)z. 
(17) 
(18) 
Note that the service sector does not face credit rationing because the gov-
ernment does not regulate the lending interest rate to the service sector, and 
r z is decided by the lending mark~t equilibrium condition. 
10 
Since this sector is perfectly competitive, yhr price equals marginal cost. 
From (17), we have the horizontal supply curve for services as 
(19) 
Therefore, from (15) and (19), the equilibrium volume of services is 
riz(i + 7rh) (20) 
When government implements the artificially low interest rate, the market 
equilibrium condition of lending funds for the service sector is kz = Sz. 
Therefore, (4), (16), (18), and (20) yield the lending interest rate as follows: 
_ ,6T]z [I + 7rh(r)] ,6T]z [I + 7rh(r)] 
rz = _ = . (21) 1- kh(r) 1- a-1a 1-<>(I- a)-(l-<»r-(l-<»xh(r) 
The deposit interest rate I is q.ecided by the zero-profit condition for banks. 
Banks have two loan outlets: the manufacturing sector and the service sec-
tor. The lending revenue for the manufacturing sector and the service sector 
are rkdr) and r z (1-kh(r)), respectively. By the rationing rule, banks must 
preferentially lend funds to the manufacturing sector at the ceiling level; they 
can then lend residual funds to the service sector. Therefore, from (16), the 
zero-profit condition of banks is given by 
(22) 
3.2 Effects of the artificially low interest rate 
We now consider the effect of an artificially low interest rate policy. First, 
we focus on the effects in the manufacturing sector. By the rationing rule, 
the artificially low interest rate policy is just a policy for this sector that 
reduces the lending interest rate without causing credit rationing. Therefore, 
by minimizing Ch = l+rk subject to (3), the cost function of firm h becomes 
Ch = a-1a-<>(1- a)-(l-<»r<>xh, and the policy decreases the marginal cost; 
a
82Cah_ = a-1a 1-<>(1- a)-(l-<»r<>-l > O. The first-order condition for profit 
"'h r 
maximization by firm h is 
P' + P - -1 -<>(1 - )-(1-<»-<> - 0 ",Xh '" a a a r - . 
. From (23) and (13), we have the following result. 
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(23) 
Proposition 2 An artificially low interest rate policy increases the output 
and profit affirm h, i.e., ~ < 0 and o/ft < o. 
Proof. Total differentiation of (23) and (13) with respect to r yields 
Solving this, we have 
~ -1 1-<>(1 )-(l-<»_<>-lD UXh _ a a - a r ff 0 
ar - IDI < , (24) 
~ -1 1-<>(1 )-(l-<»_<>-lD uXf a a - a r fh 
ar = - IDI > 0, (25) 
where IDI = DhhDff - DhfDfh > O. Furthermore, differentiating the profit 
of firm h with respect to r, we have ';rh = ~ a::: -a-1 (l~<>f-<> r<>-l xh < 
O .• 
Proposition 2 implies that the artificially low interest rate has similar 
effects on subsidy policies. That is, the government concentrates the capital 
with low interest rate on the export sector without causing credit rationing. 
The policy reduces marginal cost of the domestic firm and increases its share 
on the world market under imperfect competition. This result illustrates a 
"rent-shifting effect (Brander and Spencer 1985). It is widely known that 
subsidies can increase the market share of domestic firms, and furthermore, 
increase domestic welfare under imperfect competition. Generally speak-
ing, however, it is difficult for developing and middle-developed countries to 
implement such subsidy policies because of the government's budget con-
straint. It is often noted that the opportunity costs of government spending 
in these countries are high (Brander, 1995) because the government has a 
number of problems to solve, for example, poor infrastructure, education, 
and medical services. The artificially low interest rate can also increase the 
market share of domestic firms. Note that, however, the rigid restriction 
on foreign exchange is necessary for the artificially low interest rate to be 
effective. The details of this point will be discussed in section 4. 
Next, we consider the effect of an artificially low interest rate on the 
deposit interest rate. From (16) and (21), the revenue of banks for lending 
to the service sector is rzSz(r) = f3ryzCI +7rh), which does not depend on rz. 
The increase in 'G. has two effects on banks' revenue. It raises the interest 
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yield per unit of funds and reduces capital demand from the service sector. 
However, these opposing effects are nullified because of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function of the service sector. Thus, from (4) and (22), we have 
Note that r is a political parameter that is decided by the government. From 
(26), we obtain 
(27) 
where A == a-1a 1-<>(1 - a)-(1-<» and c == - : ~8a:: > O. From the first 
Xh r 
equality of (27), we find that a decrease in r has three effects on the de-
posit interest rate. The first term represents the reduction in banking profits 
earned from the manufacturing sector. This effect drives down the deposit 
interest rate through the zero-profit condition of banks, and is positive. The 
second term denotes the increase in capital demand from the manufacturing 
sector as a result of expansion in production (proposition 2). This effect 
raises the deposit interest rate, and is negative. Furthermore, from proposi-
tion 2, the artificially low interest rate increases the profit of firm h. From 
(1), this raises the income of households, demand for services from (15), 
and then capital demand from the service sector from (18). The third term 
represents this effect and is negative. A large value of c implies that the 
interest rate ceiling improves the competitiveness of firm h and increases its 
capital demand. If a < c, the second effect dominates the first effect and 
the right-hand side of (27) is negative. 7 We have the following proposition. 
Proposition 3 If a < c, an artificially low interest rate policy increases 
the deposit interest rate, i.e., ~; < O. 
7If we assume that household preferences are identical across regions and the first term 
in (14) has a Cobb-Douglas form such as "Ix log X == 'L;;=I "Io:n log X n , the inverse demand 
function for XI is Po: = 'lx!+Iw, where Iw is the total world income, which is constant under 
Zit XI • 
the small country assumption. In this case, from the definition of c: and (24), the condition 
a < c: is rewritten as Po: < 2a- Ia- O (1 - a)-(I-oJ1'''. This implies that the equilibrium 
price is no greater than the double average cost (or marginal cost) of firm h. Therefore, 
this condition is not extreme. 
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Next, we consider national income. Propositions 2 and 3 directly yield 
the following result. 
Proposition 4 If a < E, an artificially low interest rate policy increases 
t · l' . a1 - a1 + !!!in. 0 na wna zncome, z.e., aT - aT aT < . 
This result claims that, if the interest rate ceiling sufficiently enhances 
the competitiveness of firm h, the policy raises the interest income of house-
holds as well as the dividend income from firm h. 
At the end of this subsection, we focus on the service sector. First, we 
consider the lending interest rate for the service sector. If a < E is satisfied, 
from (21), we have 
(28) 
This is an intuitive result. The artificially low interest rate increases the 
lending interest rate for the service sector. Next, we consider the price of 
service. Since the supply curve is horizontal, from (19) and (28), we have 
- 1 ~ 
oPz = b-1 (_(3_) - r ~-1 or-z < O. 
or 1 - (3 Z or (29) 
Thus, we find that the artificially low interest rate raises the price of service. 
Finally, let us consider the amount of service. By differentiating (15) with 
respect to 1', we have 
o-Z 'T]z 01 'T]z1 oPz 
-------
or Pz or (Pz )2 or (30) 
The first term of (30) represents the effect for demand; the increase in income 
raises the demand for services, and this term is negative. The second term 
is the supply side effect; from (29), the interest rate ceiling increases the 
price, and this term is positive. From (21), (28), (29), and (30), we have 
o~ = ~z (1 _ (3/~ + (3 l' T - aT . [ 
- 1 A _-(I-a) (l-a !!!in.) 1 
or P
z 
or 1 - Ar-(I-a)Xh 
(31) 
Because (3 E (0,1), if (3 is sufficiently small, the first term dominates the 
second term in the bracket, and the policy increases the amount of services 
supplied. The above results are summarized as follows. 
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Proposition 5 Suppose a < e. An artificially low interest rate policy in-
creases the lending rate for the service sector and the price of services. Fur-
thermore, if the service sector is sufficiently labor-intensive {i. e., (3 is small), 
this policy increases the amount of services. 
The artificially low interesting policy not only reduces the lending inter-
est rate for the manufaCturing sector but also concentrates funds into this 
sector. Thus, this policy reduces the funds available for the service seG-
tor. Hence, this policy raises the lending interest rate for the service sector 
as in(28), and then marginal cost and price of the service rises as in (29). 
On the other hand, from proposition 4, since this policy improves national 
income, the policy increases the demand for service. Therefore, the effect 
on the amount of service is ambiguous. The increase in the interest rate 
leads to substitution from capital to labor. Therefore, proposition 5 implies 
that, if the service sector is sufficiently labor-intensive, the expansion of the 
demand dominates the rise of marginal cost; there is a possibility that the 
amount of service increases under the artificially low interest rate policy. 
3.3 Welfare analysis 
Here, we consider the welfare effects of an artificially low interest rate policy. 
Since the utility function is separable from (14), we consider each term 
separately. Throughout this subsection, we assume that a < e, i.e., an 
artificially low interest rate increases national income from proposition 4. 
First, we rewrite the first term of (14) in an indirect utility form: 
(32) 
Since we suppose that the home country, which is a small country, does 
not have manufacturing firms with an index n = 2"" ,N, the prices of 
these manufacturing goods, Px2,'" ,PxN, are exogenous parameters. From 
(24) and (25), we have ~ < 0, where Xl = Xh + xf' Since P~(XI) < 0, 
decreasing r increases the quantity and decreases the price of this manufac-
turing good. Therefore, the policy raises the indirect utility derived from 
the manufacturing good. 
The third term of (14) is the utility from services. From proposition 5, 
if the service sector is sufficiently labor-intensive, the policy increases the 
volume of services and then, the household utility. The second term is the 
primary good. In our model, the price remains one. Thus, the increase 
in income raises the utility derived from this good. The above results are 
summarized as follows. 
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Proposition 6 Suppose a < E. If the service sector is sufficiently labor-
intensive (i.e., (3 is small), an artificially low interest rate policy always 
improves we~fare. 
4 Discussions 
In this section, we discuss the restriction on foreign exchange. Consider an 
extreme case of free capital movement, in which there is no tJ.:ansaction cost 
associated with international financial transactions. In this case, the service 
sector can borrow funds from the rest of the world with no transaction 
costs, and the lending rate for the service sector equals the world interest 
rate R. In addition, because banks can borrow funds from the rest of the 
world at a negligible cost, the deposit interest rate also equals the world 
interest rate. Moreover, in this case, the government cannot implement a 
low interest rate polICY because banks will incur losses when the lending 
rate for firm h is decreased to the interest rate ceiling. Therefore, assuming 
some restriction on foreign exchange is necessary to obtain the results of 
the previous sections. Alternatively, we have assumed that all domestic 
interest rates are in the range given by (6). This simplification implies that 
no agent conducts financial transactions overseas. Clearly, this is also an 
extreme case. In order to adopt the artificially low interest rate policy, it is 
sufficient to allow domestic interest rates to diverge from the world interest 
rate. Thus, the propositions of the previous sections should hold as long as 
some financial transaction cost exists and the flow of international funds is 
imperfect. 
In the past, developing and middle-developed countries with interest-
rate ceilings had broadly regulated financial activities, including foreign ex-
change. These regulations created some friction; that is, they increased the 
transaction costs and validated the policy. In the era of rapid economic 
growth in Japan, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and 
the Foreign Capital Law worked as such distortions. These laws were basi-
cally enacted to economize the use of persistently scarce foreign exchange, 
and might have been effective for the implementation of the interest rate 
ceiling. Therefore, interest rate ceilings must entail some other financial 
distortions in the economy. 
Today, it is extremely difficult for developing countries to implement the 
artificially low interest rate policy. The East Asian countries that once im-
plemented this policy have discontinued it. For example, in Japan, interna-
tional fund flow was liberalized in principle in 1980 by a full-fledged revision 
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of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. Other East Asian 
countries phased out their financial regulations in the 1980s and 1990s. Re-
cently, a global trend toward financial liberalization has been observed. As 
fund markets move toward an integrated world market, transaction costs in 
funds markets will decrease. Some friction on financial transactions is nec-
essary for the interest rate ceiling to be effective. If a government considers 
an artificially interest rate policy, it needs to impose severe regulations on 
financial activities. Therefore, as a result of global financial liberalization, 
the environment where interest rate ceilings are effective may have already 
been lost. 
5 Concluding remarks 
We have investigated whether the interest rate ceiling increases exports, na-
tional income, and welfare. We prove that the simple interest rate ceiling 
causes credit rationing, and thus, it does not work as an export-promoting 
policy. Furthermore, it has no effect on the national income and welfare. In 
contrast, the artificially low interest rate, which is the interest rate ceiling 
with a rationing rule, reduces the marginal cost of domestic firms and in-
creases the income of households. We also mention that both the restriction 
on foreign exchange and the rationing rule are necessary for the interest rate 
ceiling to work as an export-promoting policy. The artificially low interest 
rate policy must entail an all-round intervention in the financial systems by 
the government. 
Some studies provide plausible explanations of the interest rate ceiling. 
Hellmann et al. (1997) consider a policy that imposes a ceiling for the de-
posit interest rate, while we investigate a policy that imposes a ceiling for 
the lending interest rate. They point out that the interest rate ceiling creates 
rent in the financial sector. 8 They argue that, by giving rents to financial 
intermediaries, the policy has a positive effect in reducing problems on in-
formation such as the monitoring of investment or the provision of deposit 
collection, which might be underprovided in· a purely competitive market. 
Demetriades and Devereux (2000) present a model that has two financial 
markets: an official financial market and an alternative curb market. When 
the government implements the interest rate ceiling in the official finan-
cial market, the official financial market cannot satisfy capital demand from 
8In their context, if the rent is deprived by the government, it leads to financial repres-
sion similar to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
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firms owing to credit rationing. However, since firms can borrow from the 
curb market with a high borrowing interest rate, there is a possibility that 
capital stock will be higher in the long-run equilibrium than the laissez-faire 
case. Daitoh (2003) investigates the effects of the low lending interest rate 
policy on urban unemployment using Harris-Todaro model. The ·policy leads 
to the reduction of savings and employment in the urban sector. However, 
this policy represses the rural-urban migration; it may decrease urban un-
employment, increase agricultural output, and then improve welfare. This 
result implies that rapid financial liberalization may aggravate welfare in 
developing countries. 
The above studies have analyzed this policy mainly from the perspec-
tive of economic and financial development. In contrast, we have focused 
on the effects of interest rate ceiling on exports, which have previously not 
been discussed in the literature. In our model, the artificially low interest 
rate policy provides aboundant supplies of cheap capital to the exportable 
manufacturing sector. This policy has a rent-shifting effect, and it improves 
the international competitiveness of the domestic firm as the subsidy policy 
shown by Brander and Spencer (1985). At the same time, however, the ar-
tificially low interest rate may lead to the same problem as subsidy policies 
do. That is, in perfectly competitive environments, this policy would lead to 
welfare loss. Moreover, there are some possibilities that this policy will in-
duce additional inefficiencies, for example, a rent-seeking problem as lobbing 
activities or delaying R&D activities in the protected industries. Attempts 
to address these issues remain topics for further research. 
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